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Abstract

Increasingly, central governments approach contentious natural resource allocation problems by devolving partial decision-making responsibility to local stakeholders. This paper conceptualizes devolution as a three-stage process and uses a simulation model calibrated to
real-world conditions to analyze devolution in Spain's Upper Guadiana
Basin. The Spanish national government has proposed spending over a
billion euros to reverse a 30 year decline in groundwater levels. We investigate how the government can most eectively allocate this money
to improve water levels by utilizing its power to set the structure of a
local negotiation process. Using a numerical Nash model of local bargaining, we nd that if the national government creates appropriate
incentives, local bargaining can produce water stabilization. The actual water levels that will emerge are highly dependent on the central
government's decisions about the budget available to local stakeholders and the default policy, which. will be inuenced by the relative
value the government places on various nancial and environmental
outcomes. Our paper concludes by determining the relationship between these relative valuations and the government's preferences over
water levels.
Corresponding Author: Susan Sayre, Assistant Professor of Economics, Seelye 305,
Smith College, Northampton, MA, ssayre@smith.edu. Carmen Marchiori is a Lecturer
(Assistant Professor) of Environmental Economics and Policy at the London School of
Economics and Political Science. Leo K. Simon is a professor in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California, Berkeley. We would like
to thank Ramon Llamas, Elena Lopez-Gunn, Consuelo Varela-Ortega, and Jose Albiac for
helpful discussions on the details of the Guadiana problem. We would also like to thank
Gordon Rausser, J.K. Horowitz, and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier
drafts of this work. Any remaining errors are our own.
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1

Introduction

A common approach to resolving contentious local resource allocation problems is to empower local stakeholders to develop solutions that are specic
to the local conditions.

This approach is often referred to as devolution.

Devolution appeals to central governments for a variety of reasons, including
political philosophy, a belief that local interests better understand the problem details, and a desire to minimize implementation costs by encouraging
local buy-in. Oates (1972) observed that the benet or cost of decentralization relative to central control is largely determined by the degree of regional
heterogeneity.

Our interest in this paper is not whether devolution is an

appropriate choice; rather, we note that, for better or worse, many national
governments have chosen devolution to address certain issues. Our interest
is in how the national government can ensure that the resulting outcomes
achieve its goals.

Our analysis is thus similar in character to the branch

of the decentralization literature that focuses on developing mechanisms by
which the central government can induce local governments to respect the
national government's goal (see, for example, Levaggi 2002). Much of this
literature focuses on a permanent assignment of responsibility for particular
types of decisions to local governments.

In contrast, our interest is in the

one-time devolution of a particular real-world policy choice.
We conceptualize this type of one-time devolution as a three-stage process. The rst stage is a

structure setting stage

2

in which a central gov-
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ernment sets the structure for local bargaining.

For instance, a familiar

pattern in US environmental policy is that the national government sets an
environmental threshold and threatens federally imposed regulations if individual states fail to meet the threshold. The threatened regulation provides
a default outcome against which the state political process operates. It also
creates a constraint on the options available at the local level; to avoid the
default outcome, the state policy-making process can only consider policies
that meet the threshold. The second stage is the

local bargaining stage

in which local stakeholders select policies within the structure determined
in the previous stage. The last stage is the

implementation stage,

determines how economic agents react to those policy choices.

which

The rst

two stages are political economic problems, while the nal stage is a purely
economic problem. This three-stage framework is used to answer three questions. First, how does the outcome of the local bargaining process depend
on the decisions made at the national level? Second, given that variation,
what structure should the national government set in the rst stage? Finally,
what policy outcomes will result given the government's choices?
This paper applies our three-stage devolution framework to a groundwater allocation problem in Spain's Upper Guadiana Basin. Negotiations over
groundwater issues have been studied in a variety of contexts.

Netanyahu

et al. (1998) apply both cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models
to groundwater allocation between Israel and Palestine. Just and Netanyahu
(1998) investigate the divergence between ideal basin-wide management of

3
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multi-national river basins and the real world experience of bi-lateral agreements within these basins.

A common theme of these papers is that the

potential for free-riding and cheating may reduce the eciency of nal outcomes.
The setting we model diers from these papers in two key respects. First,
our model considers a basin that lies entirely within one jurisdiction.

We

therefore model individual water users rather than aggregated states. As a
result, we take free-riding behavior as given; farmers in our model respond
optimally ex-post to whatever policies are imposed. Second, a major focus
of our paper is the role of the national government in setting the conditions
under which local negotiation occurs.
Over the last 30 years, the Upper Guadiana Basin has experienced large
declines in groundwater levels. In recent years, the Spanish national government has indicated a willingness to appropriate signicant funds to improve
conditions in the Guadiana.

It has also explicitly sought to involve local

stakeholders in the process, seeking a compromise solution and ceding considerable control over the plan details to local entities. Yet, the local policy
process has stalled and failed to produce a viable plan for improving water

1

levels within the region.

We believe that this failure stems from the national

government's failure to establish explicit consequences for local stakeholders
failing to achieve compromise. By failing to do so, the national government

1 In

2008, a plan was adopted. This plan is in the early stages of implementation and
it remains to be seen whether it can ultimately be successful in stabilizing or improving
water levels.

4
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has established an implicit default  the continuation of current policies indenitely. If the national government truly wishes to improve water levels, it
must use both its budgetary powers and its power to set the default to meet
its goals.
Water right enforcement is a central feature of the Guadiana problem.
Although groundwater use in the region is legally allowed only with the possession of water rights, illegal use is rampant. Illegal use is facilitated by both
the local political opposition to enforcement and the lack of infrastructure
for monitoring water use. As a result, the Guadiana problem must be viewed
through the lens of enforcement policy. There is a strong sense that eective
enforcement is only feasible if local interests accept the rules regarding water
use and that this acceptance is unlikely unless local interests feel that they
were part of the plan development. This paper does not investigate whether
local input is truly necessary. Instead, it demonstrates one way that the government might induce stakeholders to agree to a stringent enforcement policy.
The approach draws on ideas developed in the voluntary compliance literature (Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Segerson and Wu, 2006). The basic lesson
of this literature is that under certain circumstances, a government can convince rms to voluntarily comply with a goal by threatening an undesirable
alternate policy. In the Guadiana setting, it is infeasible to induce voluntary
compliance because of free-riding concerns.

Instead, we demonstrate that

with appropriate incentives, the national government can use the threat of
a relatively mild ne policy to induce stakeholders to impose a much more

5
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stringent ne policy upon themselves as part of a local compromise solution.
Since it is dicult to precisely identify the national government's goal,
we examine a stylized specication of choices facing the national government,
focusing on the national government's tradeo between the environment,
farm prot, and the burden on taxpayers. We consider various possible levels
for the government's willingness to trade between these objectives; for each
level, we identify the government's optimal policy choices and the resulting
outcomes.
In the next section, we describe the details of the Guadiana problem.
We then develop a stylized model capturing the essential features of the
problem.

We describe the main results produced by this model and then

oer concluding comments.

2

The Guadiana Basin

The Upper Guadiana Basin lies in the Castilla-La Mancha region of Spain.
The area is heavily agricultural and relies on groundwater for most of its
water needs. Over the last 30 years, groundwater has fueled signicant economic growth in the region, but has also caused dramatic declines in water
levels within the region. The declines have nearly destroyed the wetlands in

Las Tablas de Daimiel

national park, along with much of the other remaining

wetlands in the region. Moreover, declining water levels have caused many
existing wells to dry up.

A number of authors and studies have described

6

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5

the history, economics, and social conditions within the Upper Guadiana (see

Rosell (2001),(Llamas

and Martinez-Santos, 2005)).

An approximate rela-

tionship between depth and use derived from (Bromley et al., 1996, 2001)
suggests that if farmers continued current use indenitely, water levels would
fall from 50 m below surface today to 116 m below the surface in 30 years. A
series of policy initiatives over the last 20 years have aimed to improve water
levels, but have been unsuccessful at generating sustained reductions in use
thus far.
There is a substantial literature on the economics of groundwater use.
Economists have long argued that groundwater will be overexploited in the
absence of coordinated management, since it is a common property resource.
Early economic work on groundwater focused on determining the socially
optimal groundwater extraction path and proposing regulatory instruments
capable of achieving this optimum.

2

In 1980, Gisser and Sanchez demon-

strated that the benets of groundwater management can be small in practice. Koundouri (2004) presents a detailed survey of the economic literature
on groundwater, including an extended discussion of papers that have investigated the robustness of the Gisser-Sanchez nding.
Three lessons from the groundwater literature are important for the Guadiana context. First, as pumping costs rise due to lower water tables, farmers
will reduce their pumping activity. This feedback eect limits reductions in

2 See,

for example, Burt (1964, 1966, 1967, 1970); Bredehoeft and Young (1970); Brown
and Deacon (1972); Gisser and Mercado (1973b,a); Brown (1974)

7
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groundwater levels.

Under the current common property regime, our eco-

nomic model (described in the implementation section below) predicts that
this feedback is likely to be mild; we project that farmers will cut back their

3
water use from 677 Mm per year today to an average annual extraction
3
of 660 Mm , a reduction of barely 2.5%. Second, due to the pumping cost
externality, farmers would collectively be willing to limit their use if barriers
to collective action could be overcome.

Our model suggests that if cost-

less collective action were possible, farmers would reduce water use further

3
to approximately 570 Mm , a reduction of approximately 15% from current
levels. Finally, the Gisser-Sanchez results imply that the benets of reducing
the pumping externality are small, suggesting that overcoming the barriers
to collective action is likely only if there are other externalities that whose
resolution is also valued by the policy making process. In the Guadiana context, the second externality is the environmental impact on the wetlands.
In the Guadiana basin, our simulations suggest that eliminating the pumping cost externality would increase farming prots by approximately 3% (see
subsection 4.1), a value in line with many of the estimates in the literature.
A signicant feature of the Guadiana problem is the importance of ille-

3
gal water use. Legal use within the region is approximately 370 Mm , well
3
below the estimated sustainable yield of 430 Mm (Bromley et al., 1996,
2001).

However, approximately 45% of all estimated water use is illegal.

3 All

3

gures for illegal water use, and therefore for total water use, are estimates. See
Appendix A.
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Achieving reductions in water use therefore requires addressing the illegal
use problem. There are two major impediments to reducing illegal use: insucient infrastructure and political opposition. As shown in Section 4, with
current monitoring technology, an enforcement regime capable of stabilizing
water levels would be prohibitively expensive. An important component of
proposed reforms for the region involves an investment in monitoring technology.

In particular, attention is focused on installing meters on existing

wells. Particularly for farmers with illegal wells, there is no incentive to install a meter unless the government provides a reward in return.

Political

opposition creates a second obstacle to eective enforcement. For historical
reasons, the current distribution of water rights is widely viewed as unfair,
fueling public outcry against attempts at enforcing water rights. Since one
of the legal entities charged with enforcing rights is the local Water User
Group, made up of farmers themselves, public opposition has thus far been
sucient to prevent enforcement.
The result is that addressing the concerns in the Guadiana basin requires
both reorganizing and enforcing water rights. Following current discussions in
the region, we model the reorganization of water rights through a combined
program of purchasing some existing water rights and legalizing a portion
of the water use on farms that currently lack any water rights.

The key

policy variables in the reorganization program are the budget available for
acquisition of rights and the share of water use on farms without rights that
will be legalized. The key policy variables in the enforcement program are

9
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the severity of nes and the funds made available for enforcement activities.
Given the prevalence of illegal use within the region today, it is critical
that the two programs be coupled. Without enforcement, the purchase of existing water rights will not necessarily lead to actual reductions in water use;
it may simply transform legal use into illegal use. To reinforce this coupling
and to minimize enforcement expenditures, we assume that the government
will link participation in either portion of the water right reorganization program with an agreement to install a meter.
Our model structure assumes that responsibility for setting these policies will be divided between the national government and a local negotiation
process. We believe that the split described below is indicative of both political realities in the region and the decisions the national government appears
willing to cede to stakeholders in the region. At the same time, we do not
intend to imply that the national government is necessarily constrained by
the split. If it had the political will to do so over the strenuous objections
of citizens within the region, there is nothing that explicitly prevents the national government from directly setting all the policies. In the next section,
we develop a stylized model of all three layers of decision making. Our model
is designed to capture the key components of the debate at a high level. We
thus focus exclusively on water use, abstracting away from quality issues.
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3

The Model

In the rst stage of our model, called the

structure setting stage,

the

national government makes decisions that inuence the structure of local
bargaining.

The decisions are represented by the vector

z.

Once the bar-

gaining structure is set, local stakeholders select the value of various policy
instruments in the
by the vector
in the

b.

local bargaining stage.

Finally, regional farmers respond to the policy instruments

implementation stage.

by the vector

xi ;

mentation vector

The policy choices are given

The choices of an individual farm are given

together these choices determine the value of an imple-

y,

which includes both the farm choices and several other

endogenous variables. Table 1 lists each of the variables that are endogenous
to our model.
Our model includes four policy instruments, denoted by vector

g:

the

severity of nes for illegal water use (φ), the budget for monitoring water
use (BM ), the budget for purchasing water rights from farmers (BA ) and the
partial legalization of water rights on farms that currently lack any rights
(λ). Responsibility for setting these instruments is divided between the national government and a local stakeholder negotiation process.
our model implicitly includes two policy vectors: one
stakeholders fail to reach agreement and the other

gN

g0

Moreover,

is imposed if the

is the outcome of the

bargaining process. In the structure setting stage, the national government
makes decisions about how much to spend on enforcement and acquisition,

11
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Table 1: Endogenous Variables

Variable

Description

g = (BM , BA , φ, λ)
BM
BA
φ
λ

Policies selected during the rst two stages
Annualized budget for enforcing water rights
Annualized budget for acquiring water rights
Fine coecient describin severity of penalties
Legalized share of use on farms with no rights today

z = (zM , zA , zφ )
zM
zA
zφ

Policies selected during the structure-settting stage
BM available to stakeholders in negotiation stage
BA available to stakeholders in negotiation stage
Fine coecient imposed if bargaining fails

b = (bφ , bλ )
bφ
bλ

Policies selected during the local bargaining stage
Fine cocient (φ) set during local bargaining
Legalized share (λ) set during local bargaining

xi = (Li , WiS , σi )
Li
WiS
σi

Choices made by farm i
Vector of land planted in each crop for farm i
Water rights sold by farm i
Binary choice of whether farm i installs a meter

y = (L, WS , H, ρ, pW ))
L
WS
H
ρ
pW

All endogenous variables determined during implementation stage
Vector of land use by crop for all farms
Vector of water sales for all farms
Depth from ground surface to water level
Vector of probabilities that illegal use on each farm is detected
Price at which water rights are purchased

12

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5

as well as the severity of its threat to the local stakeholders. None of these
policies is appropriate for inclusion in the local negotiation stage; national
expenditures must be determined by the national government and only the
national government can impose an enforcement policy outside of the local
process. In the local stakeholder negotiation, we focus on two policies: the
severity of negotiated illegal use sanctions and the negotiated portion of water use on farms that currently lack any rights should be legalized. The water
acquisition and legalization policies are used as carrots to induce farmers
to accept more stringent nes and agree to install water meters. As a result,
farmers are only oered the opportunity to sell rights or receive a legalized
share if they agree to install a meter.
Once the national government and local stakeholders have nalized negotiations, individual farmers must respond to the policies that have been
agreed upon. Farmers thus play two roles in our model: in addition to participating in the local negotiation process, we require that they respond to
the outcome of these negotiations in ways that are in accordance with their
individual economic self-interests. Individuals farmers in our model choose
how much acreage to plant in a variety of crops, how much water to sell, and
whether to install a meter. Together, these choices also determine water use
(and therefore water levels), the eectiveness of a given monitoring budget,
and the price at which water rights are purchased.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the details of each stage
of the model. Since the model must be solved using backwards induction,
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we describe the details of the stages in reverse order, beginning with the
implementation stage, moving to the local negotiation stage, and nishing
with the structure setting stage.

3.1 Implementation Stage
The rst step in determining the impact of a policy vector
the response of individual farmers.

g

is determining

Individual farms within the model are

indexed by i. We divide the farms into four types (small farms without water
rights, small farms with water rights, medium farms and large farms) and let

τi

be the type for farmer i.

4

These types reect the major divisions between

farm types described in Appendix A.2.

Each farmer chooses a vector of

land allocated to each crop (Li ), whether to install a meter (σi ), and how

S
much water to sell (Wi ). Together, these choices are denoted by the vector



xi = Li , WiS , σi



. We assume that a xed quantity of water is applied to a

hectare of land for a given crop. The choice about how much water to use
for farming thus follows directly from the choice of land allocation.
Our model of farm optimization is necessarily schematic; we assume that
farmers plant the most protable crop and abstract away other factors that
might inuence crop choice. Moreover, our model is static; we choose one
crop allocation for the entire period. We are thus implicitly selecting long-run
crop choice and therefore do not model costs of switching crops. The model
may therefore overestimate farmers willingness to switch crops, particularly

4 There

are no medium or large farms in the region without water rights.
14
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in the short run.
Farm revenue is given by

R (xi ) =

X

(pc ϑc − ζc Lic − ξc ) Lic + pW WiS

(1)

c

where

c

indexes crops,

pc

is the hectares of land devoted to crop
parameters, and

pW

ϑc

is the market price,

c , ζc

is the yield per hectare,

and

ξc

Lic

are production function

is the price at which water rights are purchased from

farmers, determined endogenously by a budget balance condition. The rst
term is the revenue from selling crops and the second is the revenue from
selling water rights.
Farm costs have three components:
meter installation costs

(CM )

the cost of pumping water (CW ),

and expected nes for illegal use (CF ).

The

cost of pumping water is given by

CW (xi ) = eHwd · Li

where

wd is a vector of irrigation doses per hectare for dierent crops, e is the

energy cost per meter of pumping lift, and

H

Meter installation cost are

CM (xi ) = mσi

where

m

is the cost of a meter.

15

is the pumping lift in meters.
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Expected nes for illegal water use are given by



CF (xi ) = ρi φΨ Li , WiS

where

ρi

is the probability of detection,

severity of sanctions,

Ψ (·)

φ

γ

is the coecient describing the

is illegal water use, and

γ

determines how rapidly

per unit nes increase with illegal water use.,Illegal water use is a residual
amount given by

n

o

Ψ (xi ) = max wd · Li + WiS − WiR , 0

where

(2)

WiR (λ) denotes the farmer's water rights before water sales as function

of the legalization policy determined in the bargaining stage. For the three
types with water rights,

WiR

is independent of the bargaining; for the nal

type (small farms without rights), their endogenous water rights are given
by

WiR (λ) = λσi Wi0
where

Wi0

gives the farm's current water use. Since

(3)

σi = 0

unless a farmer

has installed a meter, farms without rights today will not get a legalized
share unless they install a meter.
We assume that

γ > 1,

implying that the per unit ne rate increases

as illegal water use increases.

This approach is motivated by two factors.

First, farmers' behavior must respond smoothly to changes in ne policy

16
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to use standard optimization techniques, which is guaranteed by this form.
Second, farmers in the region have expressed a preference for an increasing
ne structure (Lopez-Gunn, 2003, pp.

243-244).

The coecient gives the

ne paid by a farmer caught using one unit of water illegally.
Of course, farmers only pay a ne if they are

caught

using water illegally.

Monitoring farmers is costly and the budget for enforcement is set by the
national government. The cost of monitoring an individual farmer depends
on the current monitoring technology.

5

As more farmers install meters on

their wells, a given expenditure on monitoring leads to higher detection rates.
As a result, the probability of catching illegal users is endogenous to the farm
production problem. The probability that an individual farmer is caught if
using illegal water is given by

ρi =

where

Nm

Nm νm + Nnm νnm
· (σi ωm + (1 − σi ) ωnm )
BM

is the number of farms with meters,

a farm with a meter,
a meter, and

ωm

and

Nnm
ωnm

and

νnm

νm

(4)

is the cost of monitoring

are the equivalent for a farm without

are the probabilities that illegal use is detected

if monitoring occurs for farms with and without meters, respectively.

6

The

revenues from nes are returned to the taxpayers as described in subsection

5 Today,

monitoring in the Guadiana basin can be done by remote sensing (which is
problematic for small farms), by validating production plans, by physically visiting farms,
or by monitoring electricity usage. Discussions in the region about improving monitoring
are highly focused on the installation of meters rather than expanding other approaches.
6 We do not vary the allocation of monitoring eort between farms with and without
meters. This policy choice would be interesting to investigate in future work.
17
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3.3.
Farmers have diminishing marginal utility, giving an optimization problem of

maxxi F

for some

η < 1,

(xi ) = [R (xi ) − CW (xi ) − CM (xi ) − CF (xi )]η

(5)

subject to

WiS ≤ WiR · σi
X

Lic ≤ L̄i

(6)
(7)

c

where

L̄i

is the total land available to the farmer. The rst constraint states

that farmers cannot sell more water rights than they currently have and
cannot sell any water rights unless a meter is installed. The second constraint
states that a farmer cannot plant more land than he has.
The collective impact of farmers must be determined by jointly solving
all the individual rst-order conditions and the budget balance condition

BA =

X

pW WiS .

(8)

i

To do so, we compute the rst-order conditions for a representative farmer

7

from each type.

The full solution to the implementation stage jointly solves

7 See

the appendix for a description of the optimization technique used to address the
discrete choice of whether or not to install a meter.

18
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the farmers' rst-order conditions for each farm's choices (xi ), its detection
probability (ρi ), pumping lift (H ), and the price of water (pW ) given the
policy vector (g).

There is no closed-form solution to this system of non-

linear inequalities; its solution is denoted

y∗ (g).

Three specic outcomes of the implementation stage play an important
role in the two policy-setting stages. The resulting water level is given by

!

W L (y) = H0 − H

X

w d · Li

(9)

i

where

H0

is a baseline from which pump lifts are calculated and

H (·)

is

a function relating total water use to pumping depth. Moreover, the total
prot of each group of farmers is given by

X

πt (y) =

[R (xi ) − C (xi )]

(10)

i:τi =t

where

t

indexes the four farm types. Finally, total ne revenues are

ϕ (y) =

X



ρi φΨ Li , WiS

γ

(11)

i

3.2 Local Bargaining Stage
Today, water policy decisions in the Guadiana Basin are being made through
a stakeholder negotiation process. In our model, this process is responsible
for setting two components of

g:

the negotiated ne (bφ ) and the negotiated

19
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legalized share (bλ ).
components of
vector

gN

g

Even in the negotiated solution, the remaining two

are set by the national government. The bargained policy

is thus given by

gN (b, z) = (zM , zA , bφ , bλ ) .

(12)

Based on our review of the policy discussions, we identify ve major stakeholder groups: environmentalists, and four types of farmers, distinguished
by size and water rights. Each of the groups is represented at the local bargaining table by a single player. These players are indexed by
farm groups,

j=t

δj

For the four

and the player's utility functions is given by

Uj (gN (b, z)) = πj (y∗ (gN ))δj

where

j.

(13)

is the level of risk aversion for the stakeholder group representing

that farm type.

The environmental stakeholder group is represented by a

player with the utility function

Uj (gN (b, z)) = W L (y∗ (gN ))δj .

(14)

The outcome of the local stakeholder negotiated process is highly inuenced by the stakeholders beliefs about what they believe will happen if they
fail to reach agreement, i.e. by the vector

g0 .

We assume that national gov-

ernment makes a three-pronged threat to the local stakeholders: refusing to
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legalize any water use, imposing a penalty for illegal use, and using all its
allocated funds for monitoring. This implies that

g0 = (zM + zA , 0, zφ

,0) .

(15)

The bargaining process is modeled using the bargaining solution developed
by Nash (1950) extended to multiple players (Lensberg, 1988). In our setting,
the Nash bargaining solution is given by

maxb

J
Y

1

[Uj (gN (b, z)) − Uj (g0 (z))] J .

j=1

where

j

indexes the stakeholder groups.

The solution to this problem is

found using numerical techniques and is given
resulting negotiated policy

b∗ (z).

Similarly, we call the

∗
(z).
gN

3.3 Structure Setting Stage
We assume that the national government seeks to balance three objectives:
(1) maximizing total farm prots, (2) improving water levels, and (3) minimizing government expenditures. Total farm prots are

Π (z) = N P V

hX

21

i

∗
πt (y∗ (gN
(z)))
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and the total government expenditure is

∗
T C (z) = N P V [zM + zA − ϕ (y∗ (gN
(z)))] .

(17)

This yields a government objective function of:

∗
Ω (z) = Π (z) + αe W L (y∗ (gN
(z))) − T C (z) − αt T C (z)

where

αe

(18)

gives the marginal value the government places on water level im-

provements and
Specically,

αe

αt

is a coecient governing the deadweight loss of taxation.

is the government's marginal willingness to trade reductions

C

in annual farming prots for increases in water levels, measured in = /m .
Its value is inuenced by both the political power of environmental lobbies
and individuals' willingness to pay for water level improvements.

Absent

contingent valuation studies for the Guadiana problem, we have no basis for
selecting a particular value of

αe .

Accordingly, we consider a range of values

from 0 to 100 million euros. We vary the value of
If there were a closed form representation of

αt

from 0 to 0.1.

∗
y∗ (gN
(z)),

maximizing Eq.

(18) would be straightforward. Instead, generating each point in the mapping requires solving the numerical model. Solving this model for a single
combination can take several hours. It is thus impractical to attempt a direct
solution of the government's optimization problem using the full numerical
model. To surmount this diculty and save computation time, we solve the
full model for a grid of possible values of

22

z.

Our results presented in sub-

This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5

section 4.4 were generated by selecting the point in this grid that yielded
the highest value of

Ω

rather than the optimizing over the full model. The

results should therefore be interpreted as providing a rough estimate of the
policy choice that would be selected by the government.

4

Results

We use the numerical model developed in Section 3 to produce four types
of results. First, we compute the land use choices that would maximize an
equally weighted utilitarian social welfare function by allowing a benevolent
dictator to directly select land use for each farm type. Since land use choices
implicitly determine water use, this corresponds to allowing the benevolent
dictator to set water use. We compute these estimates for several dierent
marginal values of water level improvements. These computations provide an
estimate of the ecient level of water use. Second, we explore the prospects
for improving water levels using enforcement policy alone.

Third, we use

the bargaining model to assess whether the carrot-stick framework described
in Section 3.1 can induce signicant improvements in water levels. Finally,
we combine the full three-stage model to address the national government's
choices in the structure setting stage.
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4.1 Ecient Water Levels
The two panels in Figure 1 illustrate the impact of eliminating both the
pumping and environmental externalities related to water use. The size of
the environmental externality is dependent on the monetary value of the
wetlands. We have considered a range of possible monetary values for the

C

wetlands from 0 to 100 million = per meter.

Each point in the diagrams

represents the internalization of both externalities for a specic value placed
on the wetlands. The points are found by setting all the policy instruments
and water sales to zero and solving

maxxi

X

π (xi ) + αe W L (xi )

i

for various values of
When

αe = 0,

αe .

the impact on the wetlands has no cost to society and the

only externality is the pumping cost externality. This calculation corresponds
to maximizing farm prots and thus illustrates the impact of eliminating the
pumping cost externality alone. Elimination of the pumping cost externality
would reduce pumping lifts by approximately 30m and increase farm prots

C

by just over 8 million = per year, an increase of just under 3%. As the value
on the wetlands increases, the monetary size of the damages imposed by
the environmental externality increases. At the extreme right, the marginal
value of environmental water level improvements is set at a net present value
of 100 million euros of farm prots per meter of water level improvement
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Figure 1: Utilitarian Social Welfare Maximizing Outcomes
Water Depth
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(equivalent to roughly 3 million = in annual farm prots). In each diagram,
the consistently dashed line shows the projected outcome under the current
common property regime, assuming no policy changes occur. Finally, the line
with alternating dashes and dots in the middle of the water depth diagram
illustrates the current water depth.

This diagram suggests that if costless

enforcement were possible, the utilitarian social welfare maximizing policy
would be consistent with water level stabilization if the marginal value of

C

water level improvements just under 40 million = per meter of improvement.

4.2 Enforcement Policy Alone
Since individual farmers will always have an incentive to free-ride, the rstbest outcomes in Figure 1 are unattainable. Some enforcement mechanism
must be used to induce farmers to reduce water levels. Figure 2 shows the
resulting water depths for dierent combinations of the ne coecient (φ)
and monitoring expenditures (BM ).

The value of the ne coecient gives
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Figure 2: Water Depths Resulting from Unilateral Enforcement Policy (m)
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The labels on each contour give the depth to groundwater

The results are consistent with expectations: water depths fall

(that is, water levels rise) as either the ne coecient or the monitoring
expenditure increases. At the extreme left, when nes are zero, the size of
the monitoring budget has no impact  water depths remain at the common
property level of approximately 116m. Fines are quite eective at reducing
pumping depths small amounts, but improvements in water depths need
increasingly high nes as depths fall.
Under the special plan for the Guadiana basin, the Spanish government

C

has indicated a willingness to spend approximately 1 billion = to address
the region's water problems. Our model predicts that with this budget, the

C

government would have to set the ne coecient at around 300 = to stabilize

8 Note that according to the ne structure specied in Section 3, the ne coecient is
measured in units of =
C per ( thousand m3 )γ . For simplicity, we simply refer to =C .
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water levels at current depths using enforcement policy alone.
The results suggest that it would be

possible

to reduce water use through

enforcement policy alone. Yet, this approach will disproportionally impact
small farmers without rights. From an implementation perspective, this is
potentially problematic in that it is likely to give rise to political opposition.
Indeed, such political opposition has been at the heart of the failures of
government eorts to address the Guadiana problems in the past.

4.3 Bargaining Solution
In this subsection, we focus on the second stage of the model, taking outcomes
of the rst stage as given. First, we describe the bargaining outcome for a
given default policy in detail.

We then vary the level of the default ne

coecient (zφ ) and assess how this inuences the bargaining. In this section,
we freeze the monitoring and acquisition budgets at net present values of

C

100 million and 900 million = , respectively. These numbers were chosen to

C

be representative of current plans to spend over 1 billion = with the vast
majority targeted for a water rights acquisition plan.

C

We use a default ne coecient of 100 = for the base simulations. Bargaining against this default, stakeholders agree upon a ne coecient of

C

roughly 6000 = and a legalized share of approximately 43% of existing use
on farms without rights. This negotiated ne coecient corresponds to an
average ne per thousand m

3

C

of 1750 = for the farms caught using illegal wa-

ter. This is a high ne, particularly in relation to current pumping costs of 70
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C= /thousandm3
m

3

C

and farming prots of approximately 1200 = per thousand

of water use. In other words, with this ne level, illegal water costs over

25 times as much as legal water

if the illegal use is detected.

Yet only a small

number of farms get caught using water illegally, so the average

expected

ne

C

3
is only 172 = /thousand m . This implies that the expected cost of illegal
water is nearly three and a half times the expected cost of legal water. As we
would expect, these high nes are eective at deterring illegal water use; no
farm group averages more than 0.45 thousand m

3

of illegal water per farm in

the equilibrium. What is striking about these high nes is that farmer groups
agree to impose these nes

upon themselves

in exchange for the government's

carrots: diverting a signicant portion of its budget away from enforcement
toward acquiring water rights and allowing stakeholders to reallocate some
of those rights to farms without water rights today. This result is discussed
in more detail below.
In this base scenario, the government purchases 100 Mm
and grants approximately 115 Mm

3

3

of water rights

of new rights, increasing the amount

3
of legal water use approximately 15 Mm .

Yet the dramatic increase in

enforcement means that total water use falls from 680 Mm

3

to just under

3
400 Mm .As a result, water levels recover nearly 8 m from current levels. In

C

contrast, if the default ne coecient of 100 = were imposed in isolation,
water levels would fall just over 20 m from their current level. Negotiation
thus increases the water level roughly 30 m relative to the default policy.
Moreover, the resulting water levels are nearly 70 m higher than the projected
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Water Depth as a Function of Default Enforcement
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level resulting from continuing current policies.
To assess the sensitivity of this result with respect to

zφ ,

we solved the

local negotiation stage under a variety of default ne specications. Figure
3 shows the impact of these ne scenarios.

As expected, the nal water

zφ

rises. A default ne coecient

depth decreases (and water level rises) as

C

of approximately 50 = is suciently high to stabilize water levels given the
currently announced budget. This default induces a bargaining solution with

C

a nal ne coecient of approximately 6000 = and legalization of roughly
60% of the usage on farms without rights today. For comparison purposes,
we have included a second line showing the water depths resulting from
enforcement policy alone.

9

9 This

line traces the value of water depths along the horizontal line located at 1 billion
=
C in Figure 2.
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As in our base case example, local stakeholders choose a very stringent
ne policy in each of these solutions. Through the negotiation, farmers agree
to impose upon themselves enforcement regimes that have been seen as infeasible in the region thus far. They do this because the incentives oered by
the national government in the form of legalized water rights and water right
purchases outweigh the costs of having their water use eectively regulated.
It is critical to the success of the policy that farmers are indeed willing to
impose a larger ne coecient through negotiation than the national government threatens.
To understand this result, recall that the objective in the Nash bargaining
model is to maximize the product of players' gains relative to the default over
the set of Pareto improvements on the default. The maximum will clearly
occur at a point where all players experience a gain (assuming such a point
exists). Therefore, a bargaining solution requires increased prots for every
farm group

and

lower water use to increase the payo of environmentalists.

The only way to increase the payo of environmentalists is to ensure that
water levels are higher in the bargained solution than in the default.

The

only way to substantially improve the payo of farmers without rights is to
oer them a legalized share.

Yet, doing so increases their incentive to use

water since these farmers now pay nes on a smaller portion of their use.
Unless the stakeholders can generate enough water use savings from farms
with rights, they must increase enforcement to consider a positive legalized
share in the solution.
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The acquisition process increases the payos of farmers by oering them
payments for a portion of their water rights. In principle, this lowers water
use by inducing farmers to switch production from high water use crops to
low water use crops. However, unless there is eective enforcement, farmers
may sell their water rights but continue to use most of the water they sold.
Their legal use will go down, but illegal use will increase leaving little change
in overall use. Therefore, without eective enforcement, there may not be
funds to purchase enough rights to generate signicant decreases in water
use.
Fortunately, the model predicts that the incentives oered are sucient
to induce farmers to accept more stringent enforcement than the default

10

policy.

There are two important drivers of this result. First, the monitoring

cost saving achieved by a combination of meter installation and high nes
allow a large nancial transfer to farmers with rights in the form of water right
purchases.

Second, the water savings from the acquisition allow granting

small farms considerable rights to use water while still reducing overall water
use.

As a result, all parties gain relative to the default.

However, it is

important to realize that at the currently announced budgets, signicant
water levels improvements will not occur unless the central government can
credibly threaten to impose a default ne unilaterally should stakeholders
fail to reach agreement.

10 Note

that this is a general result of the model. For any default enforcement policy,
the stakeholders will agree to a more stringent policy in the negotiated solution.
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4.4 Structure Setting
Our nal set of results illustrates how the government might set policies in
the structure setting stage. As discussed in subsection 3.3, it is not feasible
to optimize Eq. 18 using the numerical simulation model. Instead, we solved
the local bargaining model for various values of
value of

αt

(a parameter describing how quickly the deadweight

loss of taxation increases).

Finally, we selected the point in our grid of

values that yielded the highest value of
the highest values of

zM

We then computed the

Ω (z) assuming various values for αe (the marginal value of water level

improvements) and

of

z.11

Ω.

Regardless of the value of

z

αe or αt ,

Ω were always associated with the lowest non-zero value

included in our policy grid. This result is not surprising; it is consistent

with the general observation that the most cost eective monitoring regimes
set extremely high nes and engage in very little monitoring. It is important
to note, however, that the policies in which
with the highest value of

αe = 0,

were never associated

Ω.

Figure 4 shows the selected values of
When

zM = 0

zφ

and

zA

as a function of

αe .12

the national government cares only about farming prot and

government expenditures. When

αe = 75

11 Our

at the extreme right, the national

policy grid analysis had two steps. First, we varied zφ from 10 to 100, total
expenditure (zM + zA ) from 0.7 to 1.5 billion =
C , and the share spent on acquisition from
0.8 to 0.94. Based on the results in this hypercube, we then analyzed a grid of policies in
which we froze zM at 1.25 million =
C per year (roughly 43 million in NPV) and varied zφ
from 0 to 100 =
C and zA from 0.5 to 1.5 billion =
C . Finally, we included the outcome of
continued common property access to groundwater in our set of options available to the
government.
12 In all cases, z
C per year, which corresponds to a net
M was set equal to 2 million =
present value of 42 million =
C.
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zA = NPV of Acquisition Expenditures (billion euros)

Figure 4: Policy Choices for Various Political Weights
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government is willing to spend 75 million = in net present value per meter
of water level improvement. In the diagram, we set the value of
Increasing or decreasing the value of

αt

αt

at 0.1.

has the expected impact (increases

will lead to smaller expenditures and higher depths while decreases lead to
larger expenditures and smaller depths.
When the environmental value of water level improvements is low, the
government will spend very little money and not threaten nes. The specic

C

budget of 500 million = identied in the diagram for the very lowest values
of

αe

was the smallest budget in our grid. The government might well reduce

the budget below this amount, but it will choose some action over inaction
due to the pumping cost externality. This is apparent because the identied
policy was chosen over doing nothing.
As the environmental value of water level improvements increases, both
acquisition budgets and default ne coecients increase. Figure 5 graphs the
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Figure 5: Water Depth Associated with

αe
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resulting water depths in a similar plot. The dashed line in the water depth
diagram is the line from

1

showing the utilitarian social welfare maximizing

outcome with costless enforcement and the same marginal value of water
level improvements. At the extreme left of the plot, the devolution process
described in this paper will reduce water levels
despite the cost of enforcement.

more

than the rst-best,

This result is driven by the presence of

an environmental stakeholder insisting on water level improvements in the
local negotiation. Although granting power to the local process means that
water use may be cut too much, this result is still preferred by the national
government to continuing to allow unrestricted common property access to
the groundwater. As the weight on water level improvements increases, the
corresponding depths fall. A marginal value of roughly 45 million euros per
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meter of water level improvements would lead the government to adopt a
policy that could be expected to induce water level stabilization.

5

Concluding Remarks

The numerical simulations in this paper generate several conclusions. First,
our analysis of enforcement policy conrms that it is unlikely that enforcement policy alone can successfully solve the Guadiana problem. Simulations
suggest that even with extremely high penalties for those caught using illegal water, the government would still be required to spend a prohibitively
large sum on monitoring in order to stabilize water levels at the current levels. Moreover, this policy would place all of the burden of water reduction
on farms that have no legal rights.

These farms are predominantly small,

family-owned operations and policy-makers are reluctant to destroy their
protability.

Moreover, there is no evidence that the national government

has the political will to unilaterally impose an unpopular enforcement policy
over the strong objections of those within the region.
Successful water use reduction requires coupling enforcement policy with
a water rights reorganization program. If farmers agree to install meters and
accept higher nes, the cost of an eective enforcement regime can be substantially reduced. Two possible incentives to promote meter installation are
the opportunity to sell water rights and a partial legalization of current use.
Our simulations indicate that if the national government combines sucient
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funding for these incentives with suciently strong threats if agreement is
not reached, then a local stakeholder bargaining process can stabilize water
levels or even reverse the current declining trend in water levels.

For in-

C

stance, using a total budget of 1 billion = , the national government would

C

be required to use a ne coecient of well over 300 = to stabilize water
levels if it used enforcement policy alone. In contrast, by threatening a ne

C

coecient of merely 50 = , the government can induce a bargaining solution
that stabilizes water levels for the same overall budget. The incentives are
sucient to induce farmers to install meters and to accept increased nes.
As a result, substantial monitoring savings are achieved.

The savings can

then be used to fund the incentive programs.
Many of the basic features of the model analyzed in this paper, including
the conict between agricultural and environmental uses and the problem
of enforcement, are common to many environmental problems. Increasingly,
devolution is being adopted as the policy of choice for addressing many such
conicts. Our analysis highlights the important connections between choices
about the structure of devolution and the ultimate bargaining outcomes.
In the Guadiana example, decisions made at the national level determine
whether the local stakeholder process can be eective. If the national government fails to establish a strong credible threat, the local bargaining will
produce minimal gains in water levels, if any. In contrast, with appropriate
incentives, the local stakeholders

can

achieve substantial improvements in

water levels. Moreover, these results demonstrate that by oering incentives,
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a national government can induce local stakeholders to adopt an eective
enforcement regime themselves. This level of involvement may foster local
buy-in and reduce political opposition to enforcement.
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A

Appendix

This appendix provides additional details on several elements of the model.

A.1 Implementation Stage Computations
Subsection 3.1 describes the equations that implicitly dene

y∗ (g).

Solving

this system numerically presents a number of challenges. In this section, we
describe our solution method, beginning with the rst-order conditions for
individual farms.
The rst-order conditions for land use and water sales are found by simply taking derivatives. However, the decision to install a meter is a binary
choice, so calculus techniques are inapplicable. Accordingly, we use calculus
to solve two problems, one assuming no meter installation (σi

= 0)

and one

assuming a meter is installed (σi = 1). The optimized payo in the two cases
Fi∗ (0) and Fi∗ (1). Pure prot maximization dictates that farmers
∗
∗
should install meters whenever Fi (0) exceeds Fi (1). If farmers behaved this
∗
∗
way, however, our model would be discontinuous whenever Fi (0) = Fi (1).
To preserve continuity we smooth out the installation choice by assum-

is written

ing that dierent farmers incur dierent non-pecuniary net benets from
installing meters. Specically, we assume that the non-pecuniary utility gain
from installing a meter is a random variable denoted by

θ. θ

is distributed

throughout the population according to a cumulative distribution function
given by

K (θ).

We assume this distribution is constant for all farm types.
∗
∗
A farmer installs a meter if θi > Fi (0) − Fi (1). Since all farms of the same
type are identical except for θi , the fraction of farms of type t installing a
∗
∗
meter is given by K(Fi|τ =t (0) − Fi|τ =t (1)). Clearly, this fraction increases
i
i
∗
∗
as the dierence Fi (0) − Fi (1) decreases. The variable θ can be interpreted
in a variety of ways: some farmers are likely to be reluctant to install meters,
either for ideological reasons or because they mistrust promises made by the
government in return; other farmers may be more civic-minded and more
willing to install meters to help promote responsible groundwater use.
Changes in groundwater levels occur over time. To capture this variation,
it would be necessary to incorporate a full dynamic optimization model.
However, doing so would also exponentially increase the complexity of the
analysis and provide little extra intuition.

This model therefore adopts a

static analysis, but ensures that data are consistent with respect to annual
versus lump sum values and the comparison of impacts realized at dierent
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times.

To do so, all lump sum payments in the model are converted into

annualized values. Conversions are made using a real interest rate of 5%.
The Bromley
today.

et al

paper predicts the level of groundwater 30 years from

We approximate the time path of decline with a linear model and

calculate implied pumping costs for each year. We then calculate a constant
annual pumping cost that generates an equivalent net present value cost.
Farmers make their (constant) annual decisions on the basis of this cost. In
reality, water levels would decline more rapidly in early years and then slowly
level out. The linear choice is simpler and also osets the consequences of
failing to vary water extractions over time.
The full model developed in Section 4.3 can only be solved using numerical solution techniques.

The numerical analysis uses

Matlab

's Newton-

Raphson based optimization algorithms. As noted in Section 3.2, the solution
to the implementation stage is the joint solution to all farmers' Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. These conditions form a system of nonlinear

in equalities, which

causes two numerical diculties. First, the system is dicult to solve.

13

Sec-

ond, the solution to the inner system is inherently non-smooth at the boundaries of the constraint surface. As a policy instrument changes slightly, the
equilibrium may move from a region where one of the inner inequalities is
binding to one where it is not.

This can create a kinked or discontinuous

response, which is problematic for numerical optimization methods.
Both problems are addressed by converting the inner constrained problem into a nearly equivalent unconstrained problem using penalty functions.
For example, instead of explicitly preventing farmers from exceeding their
current farm size, a large penalty is subtracted from the payo if farmers violate their land use constraint. The penalty function approach is frequently
used in the operations research literature (Pinar, 1996; Ç. Pinar and Zenios,
1994). Several other features of the basic model create non-smooth responses.
Each of these are addressed by approximating the non-smooth functions with
smoothed ones.

A.2 Data description
The main crops in the region are vineyards, cereals, horticultural products
(primarily melons, garlic, and onions), and corn. Small farms grow almost

13 There

is a substantial literature on the diculty of nding numerical solutions for complex Nash equilibrium games of this form. See Krawczyk (2005); Krawczyk and Uryasev
(2000) for a review of past approaches to the problem and a numerical solution technique.
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Table 2: Net Revenue and Water Requirements of Regional Crops

Crop

Average Net Revenue

Average

(Pre-Water Costs)
(= /ha)

Irrigation Dose
3
(m /ha)

Average Revenue
3
per m
3
(= /m )

704

1,500

0.563

C

Vineyards
Horticultural Products
Cereals
Corn

C

2,780

4,500

0.401

419

2,800

0.242

1,506

7,500

0.143

Data in this table are estimates. See Appendix A.

exclusively vineyard and horticultural products, while medium farms grow
a mix of vineyards, horticultural products, and cereals.

Large farms grow

very little vineyard or horticultural products, preferring cereals and corn.
Corn is a particularly water intensive crop grown exclusively on large farms.
Horticultural products are considered socially desirable as they promote employment in the region.

However, they are also relatively water intensive.

Table 2 shows the average net revenue and water requirements for each of
these crops.
Observed farming patterns are drawn from Llamas and Martinez-Santos
(2005), Confederacion Hydrograca del Guadiana (2007), and Llamas et al.
(2006). Farm production functions are calibrated using positive mathematical programming (Howitt, 1995).

Bromley et al. (1996, 2001) construct a

hydrological model of the Guadiana basin and project water levels under
various water use levels. They provide several data points, from which we
construct an approximate relationship between water use and groundwater
3
levels (Figure 6). Continuation of current water use (approx 675 Mm ) will
result in a substantial drop in water levels. Stabilizing levels requires substantial cutbacks. Stabilization is marked on the gure. There are several
model parameters for which information is limited or imprecise, including illegal water use and monitoring costs. However, policy discussion is currently
proceeding with information similar to that used here.
We combined information from a variety of sources to parametrize our
model. Availability of information on water use in the basin is limited. This
appendix describes our assumptions and our eorts to reconcile information
across sources.
Estimates of the total number of farms in the region varied from 20,000
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Figure 6: Projected Groundwater Depth at Various Use Levels
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Table 3: Farmers with water rights
Farm

Farm

Representative

% Farms

Number

Legal

size

size

size

with

of farms

irrigated

category

(ha)

(ha)

rights

with rights

surface

Small

0-10 (48%)
10-20 (32%)

7.2

80%

5,600

40,320

Medium

20-50

35

14%

980

34,300

Large

50-250

150

6%

420

63,000

100%

7,000

137,620

Total

Note: Total number of farms with rights = 7,000

to approximately 33,000 farms. Our analysis assumes that there are 25,000
farms. According to PEAG, there are approximately 7,000 exploitations or
legally irrigated farms in the region. Of these, 48% are between 0 and 10ha,
32% are between 10 and 20ha, 14% are between 20 and 50 ha, and 6% between 50 and 250 ha. We combined these farms into three size categories as
shown in the table below. The total irrigated acreage derived from these calculations is very close to the total legal irrigated acreage reported in Llamas
and Martinez-Santos (2005).
The remaining farms in the region are assumed to have no water rights.
Subtracting the 7,000 legal farms from 25,000 total farms leaves us with
18,000 farms without legal water rights.

We assumed these farms are all

small farms with the same representative size as small legal farms.
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Table 4: Legal irrigated surface, irrigation does and water use by crop type
Crop type

Legal irrigated surface (ha)

3
Irrigation dose (m )

3
Water use (m )

Winter cereals

62,000

2,800

173,600,000

Horticulture

24,000

4,500

108,000,000

Maize

9,000

7,500

67,500,000

Vineyards

45,000

1,500

67,500,000

Tot/Avg

140,000

4,075

416,600,000

gives us a total acreage of farms without rights of 7.2 ha times 18,000 farms
or approximately 129,600 ha. Adding this acreage to the total from Table 1,
we have a total irrigated acreage of approximately 267,000 ha. This number
is close to but a little higher than estimates of the total irrigated surface
(230,000ha) from remote sensing (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005; Confederacion Hydrograca del Guadiana, 2007).
According to SIAR estimates (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005), the
legal irrigated surface is distributed across crop types as shown in table 2.
According to previous studies on the production system of the basin, we
distinguish three main production regimes: small farms producing vineyards
and horticultural products, medium farms producing vineyards, horticultural
products and winter cereals, and large farms producing winter cereals and
maize.
Because maize is grown only by large farms, all 9,000 ha of maize production occurs on large farms. This implies that approximately 14% of the
63,000 ha irrigated by large farms is devoted to maize production. We therefore assume that 14% of the acreage on a representative large farm (or 21
ha) is devoted to growing maize. The remaining 86% (129 ha) is devoted to
winter cereals.
All together, the large farms devote approximately 54,000 ha to the production of cereals. This implies that the remaining 8,000 ha of cereals must
be produced by medium farms. This accounts for approximately 24% of the
total medium farm acreage.

According to Tarjuelo (2007), about 30% of

the irrigated land of a medium farm is devoted to vineyards. For an individual medium farm, this implies that approximately 10.5 ha are devoted
to vineyards. Therefore, the irrigated surface that medium farms devote to
vineyards is about 10,290 ha.

Finally, the remaining 46% (16,010 ha) of

medium farm land is devoted to horticultural crop production.
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Table 5: Farm Size and Water Use

Small Farms
w/ Rights w/o Rights

Number of Farms
Average Size (ha)
% of Area
% of Water Use
% of Water Rights
Avg. Legal Use Per Farm (thous. m3 )
Avg. Illegal Use Per Farm (thous. m3 )

5,600
7.2
16
12
20
13.5
1.5

18,000
7.2
52
40
0
0
15

Medium
Farms

Large
Farms

980
15
6
16
27
100
11.2

420
150
25
32
53
467
51.9

Small farms with legal rights produce vineyards and horticultural products. Since the total irrigated surface devoted to horticulture is 24,000 ha
and medium farms devote 16,010 ha to horticulture, small farms must devote
7990 ha to horticulture. Using similar logic, small farms devote 34,710 ha to
vineyards. This corresponds to approximately 1.4 ha of horticulture and 5.8
ha of vines for our representative small farms.
We assume that the small farms without water rights are similar in structure and crop choice to those with rights. This implies an additional 25,200
3
ha of horticulture using approximately 113.4 Mm of water and 104,400 ha
3
of vines using approximately 156.6 Mm of water. All together, total water
3
use on farms with no rights totals approximately 270 Mm . From Table 4,
3
water use on farms with rights totals approximately 417 Mm , generating
3
total water use in the region of approximately 687 Mm , which is close to the
3
CHG estimates of the water use in agriculture within the region (685 Mm ).
We have very little direct information on the allocation of precise water rights
among the farms with rights. The analysis in this paper was performed assuming that 10% of the water used by a representative farm with rights is
in excess of the authorized amount, regardless of farm size. Combined, this
information produces the distribution of land and water use by farm type
shown in Table 5. It demonstrates that large farms control a disproportionate amount of the water rights and produce more water intensive crops than
their smaller neighbors.
Data on crop returns vary widely. Table 8 reports values averaged from
several sources (CHG, FAO-Stat, Juan et al. 1999). These values were used
to calibrate production functions using the technique described in Howitt
(1995).
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Table 6: Crop Returns
Irrigated

Irrigated

Horticulture

Corn

Cereals

Vines

Quantity (kg/ha)

35000

10760

3500

7600

Price (= /kg)

0.122

0.16

0.18

0.19

Gross return (= /ha)

4270

1722

630

1444

315

525

196

105

2380

975

215

490

85

6

8

109

2780

1506

419

704

1490

216

211

740

0

330

270

0

1,490

546

481

740

C

C
= /ha)
Water costs (C
= /ha)
Non-water costs (C
= /ha)
Amortization (C
= /ha)
Total costs (C
= /ha)
Net return (C
= /ha)
Subsidies (C

C

Net return with subsidies (= /ha)

C

3

Assumes a water cost of 0.07= /m .
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